We live in times in which many people who are deeply concerned about the rising intolerance toward stigmatized groups nevertheless reject the language of tolerance as patronizing, depoliticizing and morally flawed. Among political philosophers from Herbert Marcuse to Wendy Brown, there is a broad consensus that tolerance is a highly ambiguous attitude and a questionable political principle. Tolerance is criticized for being both unjust and unstable. Instead of tolerance, mutual recognition is championed as a more appropriate democratic ideal. I argue that demands of recognition, when overstretched, become incompatible with the growing pluralization of liberal societies. Beyond the social contributions and moral qualities which deserve recognition, there is also a wide range of religious or secular speech acts and attitudes which, depending on the perspective, ought to be tolerated even if they cannot be wholeheartedly accepted or embraced. Whereas theories of recognition are often marked by their orientation to harmony, theories of toleration are more plausible for those who believe that in fractured and divided societies modus vivendi settlements are sometimes to be preferred to the futile search for a universal consensus. The fellowship project therefore argues for a concept of tolerance that cannot be entirely reduced to recognition. Following Jeremy Waldron and others, the project also shifts attention from the subjects of tolerance to those citizens, for example office-holders, who can be expected to develop an even »thicker skin« than ordinary citizens. Based on a definition of tolerance as the willing acceptance of the limits of one’s own social power, I will also dwell on some recent controversies surrounding the »no platform« campaigns against public figures such as Germaine Greer, Judith Butler or Achille Mbembe. (Volker Heins)